I strongly urge the Committee to carefully read and consider the detailed critiques provided by the Cornell Chapter of the AAUP regarding the proposed revisions to the Student Code of Conduct, particularly those concerning the definition, scope, and implementation of “interim measures” and “emergency suspensions.” As the AAUP’s analysis explains the proposed revisions do not address the serious problems of the lack of fairness and due process in imposing such measures prior to adjudication of allegations of misconduct. The Cornell Chapter of the AAUP also provides suggestions of revisions that will adequate address these problems. I strong endorse the AAUP’s analysis and suggested revisions. See: https://aaup-cornell.org/2026/04/10/revising-downwards-why-the-student-code-needs-reform-and-why-the-proposals-are-not-enough/ 

I submit this comment in collaboration with a number of concerned Greek Alumni.

A group of Greek Alumni respectfully submit the following comments to the Standing Codes and Procedure Review Committee for consideration as a part of the 2025-26 revision.  These ideas have been widely discussed by alumni of Interfraternity Council (IFC) chapters for a number of years.  While some of these concepts are beyond the current proposed revisions to the Student Code and Procedures, we urge their careful consideration, because a holistic examination is necessary to restore a sense of fairness and justice to the current Cornell conduct landscape.

1. Standard of Proof

Until the December 2020 revision, the Campus Code of Conduct used a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for a finding of responsibility. The administration then proposed shifting all cases to a "preponderance of the evidence” standard, and the current code split the difference by using “clear and convincing evidence” for individual misconduct cases and "preponderance of the evidence” for allegations of group misconduct.

We recommend returning to the use of the “clear and convincing evidence” standard for both individual and group misconduct. The current approach erodes the public confidence in the fairness of the accountability system.  If a system is to have an educational and deterrent effect it must instill individual accountability. In recent years, the approach toward handling cases involving alleged fraternity misconduct is to automatically suspend the fraternity in question before any serious investigation is conducted.. Putting energy into negotiating a group educational activity (such as on-line learning modules or a group training session) and to not investigate or prosecute cases against individual misconduct. This inspires cynicism among undergraduates who now expect to be accused of misconduct without any meaningful chance to contest the unproven allegations.

The result is that undergraduates (who should be held responsible for individual misconduct) can use the ADR system to trade away their individual consequences for a “black mark” on the conduct record for the entire chapter, much to the disappointment of chapter alumni, who must live with the long-term consequences to the chapter of a disciplinary record and a damaged reputation.  In many cases, there is not sufficient evidence to prove to a hearing panel that individuals were responsible, yet the lower "preponderance of the evidence” standard lets the case go forward against the chapter, even when there is insufficient evidence regarding any individual.

Cornell should remedy this manifestly unfair double standard and adopt “clear and convincing evidence” for all conduct violations.

2. Temporary Suspensions / Interim Measures

The current Student Code and Procedures have well written standard for an interim suspension:

“to temporarily suspend a Respondent pending resolution of the  underlying case where immediate action is necessary to protect the Complainant or the University community. Temporary Suspension may include the withdrawal of any or all University privileges and services, including class attendance, participation in examinations, utilization of University premises and facilities, and in the case of an organization, recognition or registration by the University, as determined by the Director.”

The problem is that over the last four years, this standard has been misapplied and too many interim suspensions have been issued. (The number of interim suspensions are in dispute because the data the VP Lombardi presented to the Faculty Senate did not include the interim suspensions issued to groups or organizations.)

The remedy for such over-suspensions, as suggested by the Faculty Senate and the University Assembly, is to limit the initial interim suspension to just 30 days.  If the Complainant or the University feels that an extension of the suspension is necessary, the case should be presented to a panel of the University Review Board showing the evidence developed up to that time and the nature of specific danger to the Complainant or to the University Community. If the showing fails, then the case can continue to a hearing or other disposition, but without the interim suspension.

3. Appeals of Interim Suspensions

Under the Campus Code of Conduct, appeals of suspension were made to the University Review Board. In 2020, this was changed to an appeal to the Vice President for Student and Campus Life. Under the current proposal, the appeal would be made to a three-person panel consisting of the Vice President, the Provost and the Dean of the College to which the student is enrolled.

There are many concerns with this proposal, and we recommend using the University Review Board.  First, in the case of group misconduct, many different colleges could be involved leading to much confusion regarding the membership of the panel. Second, in many cases the Vice President of Student and Campus Life may be present at the alleged violating event, or may have communicated with the Cornell University Police about the event, so he could have developed a conflict of interest because of his connection to the facts. The OSCCS reports to the VP of Student and Campus Life through the Dean of Students. Third, 93.5% of undergraduates voting in the December 2025 referendum favored having a conduct system independent of the central administration. The appeals of interim suspensions are the most visible form of such involvement at this time.

In general, due process dictates that appeals should be free of ex parte communications. That means that any communication from any of the parties to members of the appeal panel would be served on all of the other parties.  In recent years, there have been direct ex parte communications between OSCCS and the Vice President hearing the appeal, which should be expressly prohibited.

4. Divide Hazing into Two Separate Categories of Offenses

Hazing is a poorly understood topic with multiple definitions. However, hazing has a very negative connotation, and under recent federal legislation is now separately reported to the public and the government.  The Greek Community has used two phrases over the past few years “Hazing with a capital H” to mean serious hazing and “hazing with a lower case H” to mean more technical or marginal transgression.

The definition in the current Student Code was developed by the Skorton Center at Cornell Health to have an unusually broad scope. It reads:

“Hazing is any act that, as an explicit or implicit condition of recruitment, admission, or initiation into, affiliation with, or new or continued membership status within a group, team, organization, living group, or academic group or cohort, does one or more of the following: 

1. Causes, encourages, or compels another person to engage in any activity that could reasonably be perceived as likely to create a risk of mental, physical, or emotional distress or harm; examples include but are not limited to:

a. Undertake acts of servitude or menial tasks; 

b. Undergo undue financial expenditures; 

c. Engage in acts relevant to those of the group (for example practice or training activities), but in a manner that a reasonable person would consider excessive or dangerous; thank you

d. Abuse, humiliate, degrade, or taunt another person or persons.

2. Involves any of the following: 

a. Consumption of alcohol or drugs; 

b. Consumption of unpalatable substances, or palatable substances to excess; 

c. Damage to or theft of property, or any other illegal act; 

d. Violation of any University policy. 

3. Subjects any other person (including an existing member or cohort of existing members of the group) to any of the above activities. 

Hazing can occur on or off campus, and in person or in virtual settings. The individual subjected to hazing does not need to regard or identify the act as hazing. The fact that an individual does not object to and/or appears willing to participate in the activity, does not signify the conduct is not hazing.“

Obviously, Cornell is free to apply any label to any misconduct as it writes the definitions in the Student Code. However, there may be adverse consequences should the headlines in the New York Times misinterpret Cornell’s Clery Act reports, based upon overly-broad definitions. An overly broad definition could affect insurance rates and relationships with national/international organizations.

The better approach would be to use the New York Penal Law definition of Hazing. Anything within the Skorton definition could remain prohibited under the Student Code but with a different label, such as "Aggravated Harassment.”  This would require OSCCS to make a careful distinction when charging students and would reduce the number of hazing violations reported under Federal law.

NY Penal Law § 120.17 Hazing in the second degree.

A person is guilty of hazing in the second degree when, in the course of another person's initiation or affiliation with any organization, he intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct, including, but not limited to, making physical contact with or requiring physical activity of such other person, which creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such other person or a third person.

The Student Code of Conduct should use the Section 120.17 definition of Hazing (which is “Hazing with a Capital H.”) Anything less should not be included within the Code’s definition of “Hazing”. The Student Code needs a clear, legally sufficient definition, not one motivated by public health concerns.

5. Delegate Down Minor Offenses to Student Run Conduct Mechanisms

There are a number of student conduct areas that have been recognized as needing low level delegated responsibility so as to not warrant the invocation of the full Student Code and Procedures. Specifically, Housing and Residential Life has dorm codes of conduct. The ROTC units have their own regulation of cadet conduct. The athletic teams have the Student Athlete Rights and Responsibilities, and historically within Greek Life, chapters have their own inhouse Judicial Committees as well as the “IFC Hearing Board” to address violation of IFC policies such as recruitment rules and philanthropy requirements.

The problem is when can a misconduct act be handled by such delegated mechanisms not requiring the use of OSCCS. In practice, OSCCS become involved when someone files a complaint, typically, when the Cornell University Police  becomes involved.  Because the goal of Greek Life is to promote student self-governance, we recommend that the IFC VP Judicial serve as the person who decides which violations are sufficiently serious to invoke the Student Code and Procedures process. So, the IFC VP Judicial should be the “Complainant” in cases that he refers to the OSCCS.

6. Group Accountability

The Student Code should clearly spell out a set of criteria for when misconduct of individuals will be imputed to the alleged misconduct of the group. This is very important to avoid improper “guilt by association.” Both New York State law and Federal law have express criteria for prosecuting individuals versus corporations.  The same principles should be expressly stated in the Student Code and Procedures.

We suggest the following provision (a new Article II Section D):

D. Application to groups or Registered Organizations

The presumption is that every effort will be made to identify the specific individuals that engaged in the misconduct and to apply the Student Code of Conduct to those specific individuals.  As an exception, charges may be brought against a group or a Registered Organization for misconduct, based upon these factors:

1. The misconduct was authorized by a decision made by the group, 

2. A majority of the officers engaged in the misconduct,

3. At least five members of the group engaged in the misconduct through a shared course of conduct.

4. The misconduct occurred at an event officially sponsored by the group or registered organization

5. The publicity for the event where the misconduct occurred specifically named the group or registered organization.

If a majority of these five factors are present, the group or registered organization shall become the respondent under the Student Code of Conduct. Cases brought against a group or organization shall be handled in a manner that recognizes the First Amendment rights to free expression and freedom of association.

There are a number of documents outside the Student Code and Procedures that address group accountability and the behavioral expectation of group members.  These provisions are unfair when applied in the context of a student-body-wide conduct code, and should be revised to conform to the above quote.  Specifically, the Student-Athlete Rights and Responsibilities provide:

“Participation in a nationally recognized Athletics program places student-athletes in a position of responsibility; therefore, behavior should be exemplary.” While this may be true as a goal, student athletes should be judged by the same conduct expectations and standards of any other Cornell student; the Editor of the Sun or the President of the Student Assembly certainly has no less a position of responsibility. Further, group accountability for athletic teams or club sports should be subject to exactly the same group culpability standards as any other group, including fraternities. 

The Student-Athlete Rights and Responsibilities further provides:

“6. Be free to participate in campus or community organizations and activities whose events do not conflict with practice or competition schedules, team rules, or health and wellbeing as it relates to athletic performance. Please note the above provides coaches with the discretion to limit participation in fraternities, sororities or professional fraternities;”

Student athletes, fraternities and other groups have Constitutionally protected First Amendment freedom of association. A prohibition on student athletes joining such groups should be adjudicated with full due process rights and not be arbitrarily imposed by sports coaches without any right of appeal.  At the very least, this de facto sanction should be carefully negotiated between the Athletics Staff and the Alumni IFC after an objective review of facts and data.

The Trustee Recognition Policy For Fraternities and Sororities states: “Collective responsibility for the behavior of the members when in their chapter house or when acting as a group outside of the chapter house.” Such “collective responsibility” is incompatible with due process and any modern notion of fairness or accountability. As noted above, the problem is how one defines “acting as a group" for the purpose of this sentence.

7. Conclusion

Fraternity chapters are the product of cooperation between undergraduates, local alumni, Cornell and international organizations. Prior to 2020, Greek organizations operated outside the Campus Judicial System because fraternities and sororities were not registered student organizations. At the time, individual Greek students were subject to the Campus Code of Conduct  Without proper consultation, the 2020 revisions swept all “groups” including Varsity Teams, Club Sports, fraternities and sororities under the Student Code for “group” accountability. The past four years have been a problematic experience and should be carefully revisited. In the meantime, the final 2026 revisions should adopt the above-mentioned reforms to standard of proof, temporary suspensions, appeals to temporary suspensions, delegation down to student-run conduct mechanisms, and group accountability.

Thank you for your careful consideration of these proposals.

[alphabetical list of signatures]

Jason Cho ‘98

Norman L Davidson ‘71

Nick Fanelli ‘21

Ernest Fascett ‘71

Michael Furman ‘79

Glenn R. George Ph.D.

Richard Kauffeld ‘80

Cullen O’Hara ‘23

Robert C. Platt ‘73

Alex Pruce ‘13

Howard Schaffer ‘90

Kamaljeet Singh ‘10

Ronald Skalko ‘73

Randy Wayne

Cornellians United for Free Speech, a group of students, faculty and alumni, hereby submits comments on the 2026 proposed changes to the Student Code and Procedures. The mission of Cornellians United is to promote free speech, academic freedom, viewpoint diversity and due process rights on the Cornell campus. Our comments on prior proposals are posted at https://cornelliansunited.org/comm-on-free-expression-comments/.

Background

From January 2025 to November 2025, Cornell experienced an unprecedented attack based upon an undocumented claim that it evidenced “Antisemitism.”  Cornell was one of 60 universities investigated for “antisemitism and/or islamaphobia” under Title VI of the 1965 Civil Rights Act.  The Trump Administration announced the suspension of all federal research contracts, and this funding was restored through a November 2025 settlement. However, a case involving alleged discrimination in faculty hiring is still pending in Federal Count.

We hope that Cornell’s reputation emerged from this crisis intact. Certainly, Cornell’s donor base responded to the challenge with strong philanthropic support, and current year appropriations at both the state and federal levels remain in place. Yet, we will never learn the opportunity costs of this battle as public confidence in higher education, and in Cornell in particular, comes under direct attack.

It is human nature to over-correct for this change in Cornell’s environment in order to avoid unforced errors The result of all of this is that Day Hall must walk a tight-rope to balance the societal expectations of a truth-seeking institution against the valuable rights of the individual members of the Cornell community. We acknowledge that it is difficult to balance all of these conflicting factors. Yet, we expect Cornell’s mission as an academic institution to remain paramount when striking the balance.

Cornell’s fundamental challenge at this time is to address antisemitism and islamaphobia without creating a climate of excessive self-censorship or “cancel culture.”  In Spring 2026 FIRE conducted a survey of college students, including Cornellians. That survey found: 

• 45% of students say they have self-censored on campus at least once or twice a month.
• 80% of students say shouting down a speaker to prevent them from speaking on campus is acceptable, at least in rare cases.
• 36% of students say using violence to stop someone from speaking on campus is acceptable, at least in rare cases.
• Only 22% of students said it was clear or very clear that Cornell’s administrators protect free speech on campus.

The challenge is to modify Cornell’s conduct systems to protect the spirit of free expression while allowing interventions on clear violations of Title VI and other laws.

The Proposed Safe Harbor

The current proposal addresses this challenge by adding new safe harbor language to the Student Code:

“Cornell University affirms that free and open inquiry is essential to its academic mission. Expressive activity, including the communication of ideas that may be unpopular, offensive, or contentious, is protected and expected within a learning community committed to “… any person … any study.” The Code does not regulate speech based on viewpoint or content, and the expression of ideas, alone, does not constitute a violation of this Code. However, expressive activity, including activity permitted under University Policy 4.23, does not exempt students from compliance with the Student Code of Conduct. When conduct occurring in the context of expressive activity involves behavior prohibited by this Code—such as unlawful entry, property damage, conduct that materially disrupts University operations, or other prohibited conduct—the 

response is directed solely at the prohibited conduct, not the message expressed.”

This compares with the safe harbor in the Cornell Policy Statement on Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech and Expression adopted by the Faculty Senate and the Trustees:

“The University is committed to protecting academic freedom and to creating a learning, living, and working environment free of discrimination, harassment, and sexual and related misconduct. Based on the protections afforded by academic freedom, speech and other expression in the context of instruction or research will not be considered prohibited conduct unless this speech or expression meets the definition of discrimination or protected-status harassment under Cornell policies and procedures, and also meets one or both of the following criteria: a reasonable person in the setting would find it to be abusive or humiliating toward a specific individual or specific individuals, or it persists despite the reasonable objection of the specific individual or individuals targeted by the speech.”

Although the proposed new text is intended to offer students’ expressive rights greater protection, it is in fact less of a safe harbor than the existing safe harbor in the Academic Freedom policy statement.  The First Amendment requires a content-neutral regulation of expressive activity (as does Policy 4.23.) However, technically speech that does not also involve conduct can be alleged to be harassment, hazing, antisemitism or islamophobia. The Academic Freedom safe harbor protects from such overreach by requiring “: a reasonable person in the setting would find it to be abusive or humiliating toward a specific individual or specific individuals, or it persists despite the reasonable objection of the specific individual or individuals targeted by the speech.”  The phrase “or other prohibited conduct” should also be deleted from the proposed addition because it suggests “conduct” including speech rather than just “behaviors” (i.e. speech plus conduct.)

The U.S. Supreme Court wrestled with the conflict between regulating student-vs-student harassment and the First Amendment in 

of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education as well as the currently-effective 2020 Title IX Regulations, the test is: “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and opportunities.” All three elements must be present. The Student Code definition of “harassment” reads:

Subjecting another person or group to uninvited or unwelcome behaviors that are abusive, threatening, intimidating, or humiliating, when the conditions outlined in (1) or (2) below, are present: 

1. Submission to or rejection of such conduct is made, either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of an individual’s participation in any of the University programs or activities or is used as the basis for an adverse decision affecting the individual; or 

2. The subject conduct creates a hostile environment – A hostile environment exists when the conduct unreasonably interferes with, limits, or deprives an individual from participating in or benefiting from the University’s programs or activities. The conduct must cause unreasonable interference from both a subjective and an objective perspective. The fact that the conduct targets a group that has historically experienced discrimination may be relevant to a contextualized judgment about whether the conduct creates a hostile environment. 

Because of protections afforded by principles of free speech and academic freedom, expression will not be considered harassment unless the expression also meets one or both of the following criteria: 

1.  It is meant to be either abusive or humiliating toward a specific person or persons; or 

2. It persists despite the reasonable objection of the person or person targeted by the speech. 

Offensive conduct that does not by itself amount to harassment as defined above may be the basis for educational or other non-punitive interventions to prevent such conduct from becoming harassment if it were repeated or intensified. Mere disagreement with the political viewpoint or content of another’s form of expression – as opposed to the means or manner by which the person communicates – shall not be the basis for any intervention, even a non-punitive one. Actions that constitute stalking or sexual harassment as defined by Policy 6.4 (“Prohibited Bias, Discrimination, Harassment, and Sexual and Related Misconduct”) shall be handled pursuant to that policy.

The above quote, because it uses an “or” instead of an “and” in the second indented list does not comply with the holding of Davis. 

Speedy Trial Requirements

Both New York State and federal criminal justice laws have “speedy trial” requirements, because “Justice delayed is justice denied.” The pre-2020 Campus Code had a number of time limits which were dropped in the shift to the Student Code and Procedures. As a result, panel hearings have been much delayed.  One recent case involved a 333-day delay while a case was subject to an interim suspension. 

We propose that a hearing panel be automatically scheduled for 90 days after the complaint is filed, with the panel authorized to grant continuances upon the request of any party.  It is expected that such requests would be rare and justified by unanticipated compilations.

The prior 5 business day time limit between the panel evidentiary hearing and the issuance of its decision should be reinstated.

Shift of Antisemitism / Islamophobia Cases to Office of Civil Rights

In the Summer of 2025, the Administration proposed to transfer cases of alleged antisemitism / islamophobia from OSCCS to the newly-renamed Office of Civil Rights.  It is not clear where the language implementing this change will reside and how cases that involve a number of different alleged Student Code violations will be handled if the case also involved allegations of antisemitism or islamaphobia.  Parallel proceedings for a Respondent before the Office of Civil Rights and OSCCS should be avoided.

The Office of Civil Rights offers two alternative paths for adjudicating cases.  The sexual assault / sexual harassment path benefits from a Final Rule adopted during the first Trump Administration that improves the due process rights of the Respondent. The other path, which would include allegations of antisemitism / islamophobia does not reflect the Final Rule. It uses a single-investigator model and the “preponderance of the evidence” evidentiary standard.

Day Hall justified the shift because it felt that the Office of Civil Rights could bring greater professionalism if it handled the antisemitism /islamophobia cases. While one could give Day Hall the benefit of the doubt, we hope that these cases have the option of a hearing before a panel of the University Hearing Board and the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.  Both elements are essential to protect the campus climate of free expression. If that is not possible, we recommend that all cases before the Office of Civil Rights use that path that now applies to sexual harassment cases.

Panel Training

Perhaps the most important and complex role that the University Hearing Board must undertake is the application of free speech protections in cases that involve speech plus other conduct – such as demonstrations, harassment or hazing. Hence, we recommend that the panel members receive annual training on free expression and academic freedom.

We also recommend that the following sentence be deleted from the current Procedures document: “Training focused on diversity, equity and inclusion that is approved by the Presidential Advisors on Diversity and Equity (“PADE”) shall be required on an annual basis.” DEI is a very controversial topic, and the PADE may not be in the best position to approve training that furthers Cornell’s goal of a fair and impartial judicial system.  

Group Accountability

The Student Code should clearly spell out a set of criteria for when misconduct of individuals will be imputed to the alleged misconduct of the group. This is very important to avoid improper “guilt by association.” Both New York State law and Federal law have express criteria for prosecuting individuals versus corporations.  The same principles should be expressly stated in the Student Code and Procedures.

We suggest the following provision (a new Article II Section D):

D. Application to groups or Registered Organizations

The presumption is that every effort will be made to identify the specific individuals that engaged in the misconduct and to apply the Student Code of Conduct to those specific individuals.  As an exception, charges may be brought against a group or a Registered Organization for misconduct, based upon these factors:

1. The misconduct was authorized by a decision made by the group, 

2. A majority of the officers engaged in the misconduct,

3. At least five members of the group engaged in the misconduct through a shared course of conduct.

4. The misconduct occurred at an event officially sponsored by the group or registered organization

5. The publicity for the event where the misconduct occurred specifically named the group or registered organization.

If a majority of these five factors are present, the group or registered organization shall become the respondent under the Student Code of Conduct. Cases brought against a group or organization shall be handled in a manner that recognizes the First Amendment rights to free expression and freedom of association.

There are a number of documents outside the Student Code and Procedures that address group accountability and the behavioral expectation of group members.  These provisions are unfair when applied in the context of a student-body-wide conduct code, and should be revised to conform to the above quote.  Specifically, the Student-Athlete Rights and Responsibilities provide:

“Participation in a nationally recognized Athletics program places student-athletes in a position of responsibility; therefore, behavior should be exemplary.” While this may be true as a goal, student athletes should be judged by the same conduct expectations and standards of any other Cornell student; the Editor of the Sun or the President of the Student Assembly certainly has no less a position of responsibility. Further, group accountability for athletic teams or club sports should be subject to exactly the same group culpability standards as any other group, including fraternities. 

Retaliation

The Student Code prohibits retaliation against people who file complaints or serve as witnesses: Unfortunately, there is an unclear boundary between what might be retaliation vis a vis protected free expression criticizing the conduct process or the parties to a conduct proceeding.  A new violation would be added:

“T. Retaliation 

To threaten or take adverse action against an individual or student organization for the purpose of interfering with an individual or student organization’s rights under the Student Code of Conduct and/or the Student Code of Conduct Procedures, including but not limited to making a good faith report of prohibited conduct or for their participation in an investigation, proceeding or hearing.”

Perhaps there is a typographical error in this proposed paragraph. The sentence should be corrected to clearly state what is protected: 1) making a good faith report of prohibited conduct, 2) participating in an investigation, proceeding or hearing or 3) participating in a hearing panel. Taking action (“more than just words”) against those protected matters should be prohibited retaliation.

The Title IX procedures currently have retaliation provisions that have been terribly misapplied.  For example, a Physics professor was falsely accused of sexual misconduct by a female graduate student.  His friends and students built a website to feature what the Physics Professor considered to be relevant evidence favorable to him.  Meanwhile, the female graduate student got into an authorship dispute with a male graduate student over a research paper.  Based upon the allegations of the female graduate student that the male graduate student had created the website, Cornell delayed for several months the male graduate student’s graduation and awarding of his PhD.  Meanwhile, the male student was denied employment as a post doc. Nobody ever proved that the male graduate student was the person who built the website.

Student journalists also investigate and report on various conduct proceedings, both open hearings and closed hearings. As journalists, their reporting is protected by the First Amendment, and should be excluded from this provision.

The provision should either be dropped or rewritten to indicate that only intentional conduct and seeks to intimidate the target is actionable. For example, a party to the case making a generalized statement claiming innocence would not be sufficient to be the basis of a retaliation claim against a fact witness.

The proposed definition is unclear and may be already covered by other provisions. How is “Retaliation” defining conduct that would not also qualify as “Harassment” or “Obstruction with Code of Conduct Investigation and Adjudication Process” subsection 7 -”retaliation”?

For the foregoing reasons, Cornellians United respectfully requests modifications to the proposal.

Respectfully submitted,

Randy Wayne in consultation with Cornellians United for Free Speech 

Over the past couple of years the university administration has weaponized the use of temporary suspensions as a way to short-circuit the proper hearing process and intimidate/punish students who engage in speech the administration does not like. By abusing what is supposed to be an interim protective measure (to be used only in extraordinary circumstances when the safety of the university community is deemed to be at risk) and using it instead as a form of preemptive punishment, the administration has made a mockery of the student code of conduct. This situation must be addressed.  Unfortunately, the proposed revisions do not do enough to prevent this kind of abuse by the administration. I STRONGLY endorse the AAUP's suggestions about how to address these concerns: https://aaup-cornell.org/2026/04/10/revising-downwards-why-the-student-code-needs-reform-and-why-the-proposals-are-not-enough/

Submitted on behalf of the RCC office:

Procedures Section XVIII(G) (pp. 20–21): Parties’ review of the draft investigative record
The revised language narrows the kinds of comments parties may make on the draft investigative record, emphasizing “spellings or grammatical errors,” “clarification,” “objective inaccuracies,” redactions, inclusion of material deemed irrelevant or duplicative, additional meetings, and further investigation. The Procedures should make clear that parties may submit substantive written comments on content—not just technical corrections—so that the final record fairly captures disputed issues and reduces surprise at hearing. Because the investigator retains “complete discretion” over whether to grant additional meetings or conduct further questioning, a party may otherwise have no meaningful opportunity before the hearing to identify what facts are actually disputed, explain why a witness account is incomplete or misleading, or note material omissions in the record. 

Code Section IV(C)–(E) (pp. 5–8): Separation of cannabis/marijuana offenses from other controlled-substance offenses
The separation of cannabis- and marijuana-related behavior from other controlled-substance offenses is a positive revision. The revised structure is clearer and more proportionate. Treating cannabis and marijuana separately better reflects the reality that these offenses are often viewed differently from conduct involving other controlled substances.

Code Section IV(P)(6) (pp. 10–11): “Refusing to participate, without a substantial reason, as a witness”
This provision should be removed. The University should not make it a disciplinary offense for a student to decline to serve as an unwilling witness in another student’s case. As drafted, this language risks pressuring reluctant witnesses to participate even where they are fearful, confused, potentially self-incriminating, or simply unable to contribute useful information. That pressure may undermine, rather than improve, the reliability of the process by encouraging evasive or coached testimony. It also gives OSCCS unnecessary leverage over witness behavior in a way that may diminish confidence in the neutrality of the system. The University can encourage cooperation without threatening discipline for nonparticipation. If removal of this provision is not feasible, the Code should provide a non-exhaustive list of substantial reasons why a witness could refuse to participate without violating this section. 

Procedures Section XVIII / Investigations Generally: Timeliness and transparency
Numerous respondents have raised concerns about the length of investigations and the lack of transparency regarding case progress. Even if the Committee does not wish to impose rigid deadlines, the Procedures would benefit from an expected investigation timeline or periodic status-update requirement, with flexibility for OSCCS to extend deadlines in unusually complex matters after notifying the parties. Greater predictability would improve fairness and confidence in the process. Investigators should be required to issue a rough investigation timeline indicating the approximate timeframe for conducting interviews, gathering evidence, reviewing and compiling the record, issuing the final record and report, and scheduling a hearing. 

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

• Lack of mens rea and absence of mental health defense 
  • The Code currently has no mens rea requirement (willfully, knowingly, recklessly, negligently) and does not recognize any form of mental health defense, regardless of the circumstances or medical evidence. So even if the conduct was accidental, unintentional, or due to mental illness, the respondent will still be found responsible. This approach unfairly equates negligent or illness-driven conduct with deliberate, intentional wrongdoing, and imposes harsh consequences on students who are not morally culpable. 
  • Where there is no articulated mens rea requirement, “knowingly” should be codified as the default, which would prevent the Code from being overinclusive and sweeping in students who had no wrongful intent. 
• Withholding degrees
  • Withholding degrees pressures students into AR and creates a disproportionate impact on students about to graduate. It effectively punishes students before any finding of responsibility, preventing them from applying to graduate programs, jobs, internships, or fellowships while they wait for often lengthy proceedings to conclude. This delay can create significant gaps in students’ educational and professional timelines and impose long-term consequences on their careers regardless of whether they are ultimately found responsible.
  • Violates the principle of innocent until proven guilty which is articulated in the Code. Students should be presumed not responsible until and unless found responsible. 
  • There are no protections at all, no way to appeal the withholding of a degree, and there are no articulated factors that OSCCS must consider when deciding whether to withhold degrees. 
• Organizations and good samaritan protocol (GSP)
  • Allowing organizations to be covered by GSP would result in more people that need help getting it and would remove the fear of reporting that organization leaders may have. 

Noah Graddis,

Respondent's Code Counselor

Dear Code and Procedures Review Committee:

Below are comments and concerns submitted on behalf of the Office of the Respondents' Codes Counselors. 

Procedures Section VIII(C) (pp. 10–11): Emergency Suspension Factors

• The revised factors for emergency suspension are, in several respects, an improvement. In particular, the focus on whether the incident posed an “objective threat to the physical safety of others,” involved force or a weapon, or created a reasonable basis for concern about health or safety. However, these factors are meaningless if they are not required to be weighed when determining whether to impose an emergency suspension. This section should be rephrased to state, “While no one factor is determinative, the following factors, among others, must be considered in this assessment.” 

Procedures Section VIII(C)(1)(d) and VIII(C)(2)(d) (pp. 10–11): “disruption to university operations, including teaching and learning”

• We are concerned that the revised emergency-suspension factors expressly include possible “impact on or disruption to university operations, including teaching and learning,” as a basis for Emergency Suspension. Emergency Suspension is supposed to be reserved for “extraordinary circumstances” where “immediate action is necessary” and less restrictive measures are insufficient. That standard is a poor fit for many alleged disruptions to university activities, especially in the protest context, where students may be charged with disruption but do not pose an objective threat to health or safety. The “disruption to university operations, including teaching and learning” language is too broad, and should be narrowed by rephrasing to “material and substantial disruption to university operations.”

Procedures Section VIII(C)(1)(e) and Section VIII(C) (Organization)(e) (pp. 10–11): “multiple unresolved conduct referrals”

• We are concerned, moreover, that the revised emergency-suspension factors expressly permit reliance on “multiple unresolved conduct referrals” before any adjudication has occurred. Elsewhere, the Procedures preserve a presumption that an individual respondent is “not responsible” unless and until responsibility is found by the Hearing Panel. Allowing unresolved referrals to weigh in favor of emergency suspension risks treating unproven allegations as evidence of culpability. 

Procedures Section VIII(C) (pp. 10–11): Access to the materials underlying an emergency suspension

• The revised provision requiring that an individual respondent receive “a copy of the underlying incident report and any additional documentation collected as part of the Emergency Suspension assessment” is an important fairness protection and should be retained. The same protection should be extended to organizational respondents, who under the current proposal would only be entitled to “a written determination detailing the basis for the Emergency Suspension.” Organizations, like individual respondents, should be able to review the materials underlying such a serious interim action, though redactions should be applied as necessary to protect the identity of witnesses or in furtherance of other legitimate safety concerns.

Procedures Section VIII(B) and VIII(C) (pp. 9–11): Access to materials supporting restrictive interim measures

• The same principle should also apply, in some form, to restrictive interim measures. The revised Procedures require the Director to provide “a written rationale” for restrictive interim measures, which is helpful, but a respondent often cannot meaningfully challenge a restrictive measure without seeing the basic materials on which it rests. Where OSCCS relies on a report or other documentation in imposing significant restrictions, the respondent should receive that material, or at least a sufficiently detailed summary of it, subject to appropriate redactions. Otherwise, review of interim restrictions risks becoming a hollow exercise rather than a meaningful opportunity to revisit and narrow restrictions that, in past cases, have been quite severe—including so-called “social suspensions” confining students to their dorm rooms except to attend classes.

Procedures Section VIII(E)–(F) (pp. 12–13): Review of emergency suspensions

• The revised Procedures appear to provide a more robust review mechanism for individual students than for organizations. Individual students may seek review before a three-person panel, while organizational review appears to rest with the VPSCL alone. Given the seriousness of an emergency suspension for an organization—which may halt all operations, recruitment, meetings, and events—a more deliberative review structure would be preferable. Cornell should provide organizations with a multi-member review body as well, with a faculty member from the Hearing and Review Board serving in place of the dean who would review an individual student’s emergency suspension.

Sincerely,

Colleen Denmon on behalf of the Office of the Respondents' Codes Counselors

Dear Code and Procedures Review Committee:

Below are comments and concerns submitted on behalf of the Office of the Respondents' Codes Counselor. 

Code Section III, Section B. Transcript Notations, Disciplinary Reporting, Degree Holds (p. 4): “Minor offenses are not reported.”

• This section confuses reportability with transcript notations and falsely states that minor offenses are not reported. It is true that minor offenses may not result in a notation on a student’s transcript. However, any and all findings of responsibility are reportable to other universities, professional organizations, and certain employers. This section should be rewritten and clarified into three separate parts: (1) transcript notations; (2) disciplinary reporting; and (3) degree holding. 

Code Section III, Section C. Interaction with Criminal Proceedings (p. 4-5):

• This section requires more clarification. It states that the criminal/civil process and the Code process may run “concurrently” and “the Code does not govern criminal conduct.” Without further clarification, this section prompts the inference that each will not influence the other. Although criminal and civil proceedings will not influence conduct determinations, all aspects of the Code’s investigation—including meetings with non-lawyer Conduct Codes Counselors—and hearing board discussions/decisions are criminally and civilly discoverable, upon Cornell’s compliance. As written, this section may mislead the reasonable student into self-incrimination, thinking that their disclosures are privileged from their civil or criminal case. Therefore, another sentence disclosing the discoverability of OSCCS’s records is necessary.

Code Section IV, P(6). Obstruction of Student Conduct Process (p. 11): “Refusing to participate, without a substantial reason, as a witness in an investigation of or proceeding brought to enforce potential violations of this Code.”

• This is a pretty clear violation of First Amendment rights. The University should not be allowed to scare students with a charge for refusing to be a witness. Given that other parts of this same section require truthful statements, this may directly lead to witnesses being forced to incriminate themselves.

Code Section IV, T. Retaliation (p. 11): “To threaten or take adverse action against an individual or student organization for the purpose of interfering with an individual or student organization’s rights under the Student Code of Conduct and/or the Student Code of Conduct Procedures, including but not limited to making a good faith report of prohibited conduct or for their participation in an investigation, proceeding or hearing.”

• This should be reworded because it can be read (or at least easily misinterpreted) to say that making a good-faith report is a form of retaliation. A possible rewording is: “To threaten or take adverse action against an individual or student organization for the purpose of interfering with an individual’s or student organization’s rights under the Student Code of Conduct and/or the Student Code of Conduct Procedures, including but not limited to the right to make a good faith report of prohibited conduct or participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” 

Procedures Section XV. Negotiated Resolution of a Formal Complaint (pp. 15-16).

• The current procedures require the investigation to be paused during Alternate Resolution. This change from “will” to “may,” will no longer mandate the pause of an investigation, but instead include specific factors to be considered when assessing whether to pause the investigation.
• Adding language requiring notification of whether the investigation has been paused seems important here. Otherwise, it seems plausible that a resolution process begins and the parties assume the investigation is paused, yet it continues without their knowledge, potentially moving into new phases and adding new evidence that might alter the resolution considerations. Parties should at least be guaranteed notice of a continued investigation.

Thank you for your time and effort.

Sincerely,

Maren Geiger on behalf of the Office of the Respondents' Codes Counselors.

I share the concerns described in detail below about interim measures and emergency sanctions. Such sanctions should be used only in the case of immediate safety threats, should have a short, set expiration date with a requirement for expedited adjudication, and should not be applicable in cases of political expression. We need even more explicit language to protect the right of students to protest. There is still too much ambiguity about what kind of conduct is "sanctionable." We also need more robust protections to ensure that the appeals process is based in shared university governance.

Dear Code and Procedures Review Committee:

Thank you for providing the opportunity to comment on Cornell’s proposed changes to the Student Code of Conduct and Procedures. In consultation with FIRE, I hereby submit the following comments for the Committee’s consideration.

Comments on changes to the Code:

In Section I, the Principles and Values section of the Code, the following language is proposed as an addition: 

When conduct occurring in the context of expressive activity involves behavior prohibited by this Code—such as unlawful entry, property damage, conduct that materially disrupts University operations, or other prohibited conduct—the response is directed solely at the prohibited conduct, not the message expressed.

This sentence uses the words “is directed,” presumably to express that this is Cornell’s intention in the disciplinary process–but the use of present tense makes it sounds as though it is an observation rather than a statement of principles and values. It would be clearer to use a phrase like “shall be directed” or “must be directed” in its place, so it will be clear that this is not merely prefatory material, but a statement of purpose.

Also in Section I, we are pleased that the proposed language strengthens Cornell's existing commitment to the core value of Free and Open Inquiry and Expression, formally adopted in 2019. The draft language, if enacted, will earn Cornell a spot on FIRE’s list of over 100 colleges and universities that have adopted a version of the Chicago Statement and send a strong message to the university community that Cornell is a place where all members of the community can express their opinions, test ideas, and debate important issues. 

Comments on changes to the Procedures:

Throughout Section VIII, which has been retitled to Interim Measures and Emergency Suspensions, all mentions of these measures being “temporary” have been removed. Section VIII. A. now states that “Restrictive Interim Measures are intended to be time-limited in nature” but does not say that non-restricted interim measures are intended to be time limited or temporary. While the term “interim” itself could be said to imply that the measures will be temporary, the repeated removal of the word “temporary” and the qualifying word “restrictive” suggest that these measures may drag on far longer than any student would suspect of an “interim” or “emergency” measure.

When dealing with emergency suspensions, the changes are more concerning still. Section VIII. C. removes the statement that “the form of Temporary Suspension imposed shall be the least restrictive option that reasonably affords the necessary protections.” It is unclear why it would be in Cornell’s interest or in the interest of any party to issue an “Emergency” (previously “Temporary”) Suspension that is not the least restrictive option that protects all concerned, given that no determination of responsibility has yet been made.

The changes also contemplate that so-called “Emergency Suspensions” might last far longer than any reasonable person would characterize as an “emergency.” Indeed, the policy now adds language in Section VIII. D. saying that “the Issuing Official will conduct a reassessment of the necessity of the Emergency Suspension prior to the commencement of the following fall or spring term and each fall or spring term” after the original term in which the suspension was issued. Coupled with the earlier removal of all uses of the word “temporary” in these contexts, this strongly suggests that Cornell is contemplating so-called “emergency” suspensions that last a very long time. While this obviously opens the door to abuse by allowing a student or organization to be punished indefinitely while repeatedly denying it the hearing to which it is entitled, it may also have the effect of reducing any incentive on Cornell’s part to hold those hearings in a timely manner, decreasing the reliability of the ultimate resolutions of cases. While Section VIII. E. does provide for review of emergency suspensions, in its second paragraph it also eliminates an appeal to the Provost that was previously present. 

In sum, the changes to the Interim Measures and Emergency Suspensions sections of the code seem likely to increase the risk of arbitrary and unjust measures being taken against students and student organizations, while simultaneously reducing their ability to contest any such measures.

In Section XXI regarding Appeal of a Hearing Panel Decision, the respondent has been stripped of the ability to request a stay pending appeal to the Review Panel. While such stays may not usually be warranted, such a stay can be a critical protection in cases where the lower-level adjudication of the case has produced a clearly erroneous outcome, and where enforcing the sanction in the meantime would potentially do serious damage to the respondent. Such an outcome is especially likely in cases that deal with charged political or ideological expression, where decisions made under the intense and immediate pressure that can follow a campus controversy may be readily identified as faulty after sufficient time has passed. Since the removed provision gave the Review Panel broad discretion whether or not to approve such a stay, and that decision was not even appealable, removing that possibility entirely seems a recipe for allowing unjust decisions to adversely affect Cornell community members far longer than necessary, without providing any obvious countervailing advantage to the system generally. 

Thank you for your consideration of these comments.

Randy Wayne

I share many of the concerns expressed by others, especially that these proposed changes do not go far enough in curbing the use of interim measures and emergency sanctions. These extreme responses must be limited both in how long they can be in effect and when they can be implemented. I also agree with the calls for the appeals process to be independent from university administration.

The proposed code of conduct revisions fail to address some of the key abuses possible in the existing system: the arbitrary, and not time-limited, use of interim or emergency sanctions without due process. Every interim or emergency measure should be highly time-limited (30 days at most) and should be default expire unless it is reviewed by an independent body (such as the existing hearing boards) and deemed appropriate. Interim/emergency measures should never remain indefinitely as they begin to function as a form of coercion that end runs around due process for adjudicating violations rather than as the temporary protective measures they are supposed to be. 

The current Student Code is clear that temporary suspensions, which are imposed before responsibility has been adjudicated, shall only be used when “immediate action is necessary to protect the Complainant or the University community.” This language has been insufficient to prevent administrative abuses. As a result, the Faculty Senate, University Assembly, the Student Assembly, and the Graduate and Professional Student Assembly, as well as the Cornell Committee on Expressive Activity (CCEA), have all recommended more structural changes to the procedures. 

These are not currently present in the proposed revisions. Structural checks should include the following: 

1. the imposition of extraordinary interim or emergency measures must truly be temporary, ending after a short and well-defined period unless replaced by any sanctions following a final determination of responsibility or renewed by a decision made by a body truly independent of that which issued them in the first place. 
2. the use of extraordinary measures, whether interim or emergency, must be accompanied by heightened responsibility on those who are issuing them. In issuing interim measures or emergency suspensions, the Office of Student Conduct and Community Standards (OSCCS) must commit to prioritizing a speedy resolution of the case, including a fast appeal process, even if this means additional work or costs. 
3. there must be a genuinely independent appeal of the decision to impose them. The appeal process for emergency suspensions must be altered by expanding the panel to include already-trained members of the Hearing Panels. 

These checks would give the University the flexibility to respond to protect the campus community and persons, while also limiting their use to exceptional circumstances and protecting students against abuse. 

Other needed amendments to the CPRC proposals include:  

• The list of interim measures needs to be treated as exhaustive, rather than open-ended examples;
• Among the interim measures listed, “changes in campus housing” needs to be clarified to exclude denial of housing; “no-contact orders” should only be issued when there is a request by one of the parties; and “restrictive orders” need to be dropped from the list, as they could amount to effective suspensions or persona non grata orders, for which the emergency suspension process should be used, or greatly narrowed in scope.
• Interim measures must be limited to a defined time period, calibrated to the severity of the measure. The timeline can be set by the Director simultaneously with the imposition of interim measures, but must not exceed 30 days for restrictive measures.
• When imposing interim measures, the Director must also be required to set a deadline for the convening of a Hearing Panel to determine responsibility. If the deadline is not met, the interim measures must be lifted at that time. 
• The timeline for the appeal process determined by VPSCL must be set within days upon receipt of an appeal, and must be shorter than the timeline established by the Director. There is no reason why the appeal could not be required to be decided within two weeks.
• The considerations for use of emergency suspensions should be revised to exclude “multiple unresolved conduct referrals,” which treats as evidence of guilt previous referrals that have not been adjudicated on the merits; the category of “ongoing concern over possible impact on or university operations” needs to be revised to include only “essential operations” and to drop the word “impact,” which is far too vague and encompassing given the severity of the measures.
• After a defined period, the burden for continuing an emergency suspension should be flipped: the suspension should be automatically lifted after 30 days, unless there has been a decision by an independent body that the suspension should remain in effect, either as part of a regular determination of responsibility or as a continuation of the temporary measure, with the same sunsetting requirements, by an appeals body.
• The timeline for the appeals of emergency suspensions must be reduced and made binding. The CCEA suggested 2-3 days, given the severity of a suspension. The proposal should be revised to read “generally no later than three days, and in no case longer than two weeks.”
• The composition of the appeal panel for emergency suspensions should be expanded to include people with genuine independence from central administration. Three members, including at least one non-administrative faculty, should be drawn from the existing and already trained Hearing Panels for inclusion on the appeal panel. 
• A denial of an appeal should not alter the timeline requirements we propose.  If an appeal is denied, and if a suspension continues at the end of the 30 day period, and if the Director requests that an emergency suspension be reimposed, a panel with a similar composition as we proposed above should be convened to decide on that request.
• For both interim measures and emergency suspensions, it must be explicitly stated that neither the “issuing official” nor a complainant can serve in an appellate role. 

The revisions move in the right direction IMHO.

The threat to "health and safety," listed among the interim suspension criteria. is vague.  I hear often about "our obligations under Title VI."   Does "health" include "mental health"?  If a vocal and incendiary verbal protestor says something that makes another student uncomfortable and afraid, even if that reaction is one a "reasonable person" might find questionable, is it a threat to "health and safety"?  Where lies the boundary between making someone uncomfortable and creating a "hostile environment"?  I think some of the temporary suspensions issued so far have been in response to conduct I would consider "uncomfortable-making" but far short of threatening "health and safety."

Regarding appeals, I shudder to think of someone other than the eminently reasonable VP Lombardi handling these.  

University Privacy recommends further clarifying page 10, Section IV (N), #4 as follows:

Current: To access the documents or records of the University or person without authorization, whether physical or electronic (i.e., “hacking”)

Proposed: To access the documents or records of the University or person without proper authorization or for an unauthorized purpose, whether physical or electronic (i.e., ‘hacking’);”

There must be a short and well-defined period for interim and emergency measures. No restricitve measures should exceed 30 days.

1. The proposals for revisions are insufficient. As we have discussed and voted on repeatedly in Faculty Senate, interim or emergency measures must be actually temporary and lifted within a specific period  (say, 30 days) following a speedy hearing process. These measures should be accompanied by responsibility and accountability on those issuing them. The resolution of cases, including appeal processes, must be speedy (and not take the duration of nearly an entire academic semester or year as they do now). There must  be an actual independent appeal process, not overseen by university administrators. 

Thank you for giving me the ability to comment. 

Throughout the history of law, and certainly throughout the history of the Campus Code, the tool of Emergency Suspension has been open to abuse and has indeed been abused. The only remedy lies in the careful provision of procedural protections. 

These protections are currently lacking in the Code. I therefore propose three essential amendments: 

Standard. The current Code states no standard for imposing interim measures, other than that the Director must act “with fairness towards and notice to the Respondent.” For a temporary suspension, it “may be imposed only when available less restrictive measures are reasonably deemed insufficient to protect the Complainant or the University community.” These provisions leave the matter totally in the discretion of the administration.

The administration’s proposed revision to the Code makes a few vague moves toward imposing guardrails, such as requiring extraordinary circumstances for an Emergency Suspension. But the glaring absence remains a lack of a standard of decision. A standard of decision is necessary to guide the initial decision on temporary relief and to permit meaningful review. The standard must call for the balancing of the stated relevant interests, but it must be general enough to cover all future situations while still saying something meaningful.

I propose adding this kind of standard: “After considering alternative remedies such as monitoring, counseling, or isolating the Respondent, the Director or other Presidential delegate may grant an Emergency Suspension only if he or she articulates in writing how the expected immediate harms of declining to suspend—harms to the safety of persons and to university property and operations while the case is adjudicated on the merits—outweigh the expected harms from suspension. This standard of decision requires consideration of both the immediate harms to the University community and also the disruption to the education of a person not yet found to be in violation.”

The proposed standard would serve to focus the arguments and thinking on whether to grant temporary relief. It advises the decisionmaker to consider alternatives. But if an Emergency Suspension is to come, it should come only if the expected harms of not acting outweigh the expected harms of acting.

Hearing. The current Code and the proposed revision provide nothing in the way of hearing. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-82 (1975), set out this bare minimum of an informal hearing before granting interim measures and temporary suspensions:

But it would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communication was sought by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an injustice is not done. . . .

We do not believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. [T]he student [must] be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. . . .

There need be no delay between the time “notice” is given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is.

The Code should provide at least this “bare minimum” of protection.

Appeal. The current Code allows a suspended person to file a written request to lift the temporary suspension with the VP SCL. The burden is on the Respondent to show that “good cause” is lacking. The Vice President’s decision is final, except that a complete suspension from all university activities may be appealed to the Provost.

The proposed revision does make some improvements, especially in substituting a Review Panel for the VP SCL. Three persons would thus have to agree on any abuse. I would have preferred the Respondent’s being able to make an expedited appeal to the University Hearing Panel, as the old Code provided, and with further review being possible. But I grant that such change is a lost cause.

One change is possible. The burden of proof should be shifted off the Respondent, where the proposed revision impliedly puts it (“If the panel determines that good cause for the Emergency Suspension is inadequate or absent, that other less restrictive alternatives are available that would allow the Respondent to continue academically while affording the necessary protectors [sic] . . . .”). That is, the review should succeed if the Panel determines that the Issuing Officer has not shown the exercise of the Emergency Suspension power to be correct.

Other concerns. I forward these three ideas. But I do not mean to suggest that all else is good with the Code’s treatment of Interim Measures and Emergency Suspensions. The revisers should remain open to minor tweaks, such as limiting the Director’s ex parte contact with the Review Panel.

Also, I certainly think that Interim Measures can sometimes be far too serious to be dealt with in the offhand manner reflected in the revision. We could provide for “serious” Interim Measures being entitled to the enhanced procedures that Emergency Suspensions receive. If the Review Panel thought the measures to be nonserious, it could just dismiss the review and remit the Respondent to the lesser procedures for nonserious measures. If the revisers view “serious” as too vague a term, I note that the Student Sexual Misconduct: Procedural Frameworks for Colleges and Universities § 2.9 (Am. L. Inst. 2022) drew the line between consensual and nonconsensual measures. Maybe that’s a better place to enhance the procedures.

Professor A drives on campus, heading to work. Student B darts out in front of his car. Professor A accidentally causes Student B to suffer "physical harm." Professor A has violated sec. IV.B. (captioned "Assault or Endangerment") because Professor A has "engage[d] . . . in conduct that does . . . result in physical harm . . . to a person." If not, why not?

Student C and Student C's friend D are friends from high school. D calls Student C and tells Student C that D is planning on coming to Cornell to watch a football match between a Cornell team and a team representing the college at which D is enrolled. D asks Student C if D can spend a night in Student C's dorm room. Student C agrees and "invite[s] [D] to campus." D spends a night in Student C's dorm room. Unknown to Student C, D steals something from another student's room during his stay with Student C. Student C has violated sec. IV.F (captioned "Collusion or Complicity") because Student C, albeit unwittingly, has "aid[ed] . . . another person, including a person invited to campus by the individual, to commit a violation of the Code." If not, why not?

Student E has just finished taking the final exam for Professor F's course. Professor F has already submitted final grades for the course. Student E does not know Professor F has already submitted final grades for the course. Student E stops by Professor F's office with a box of chocolates. Student E says to Professor F: "I really enjoyed your course. Here is a box of chocolates as an expression of gratitude." Student E offers the chocolates with the intent to influence Professor F to give Student E a higher grade in the course than Professor F would otherwise have given Student E. Not wanting to insult Student E, Professor F accepts the gift. At the time Professor F accepts the gift, Professor F believes Student E is offering it to influence Professor F to give Student E a higher grade in the course than Professor F would otherwise have given Student E. The grade Student E receives in the course is the grade Professor F originally submitted before Student E offered the box of chocolates. Have both Student E and Professor F violated sec. IV.D (captioned "Bribery")? If not, why not?

I believe these examples could be multiplied. In general, the "Prohibited Conduct" provisions fail to state with sufficient specificity the mental states required to establish a violation, unless of course the provisions were drafted with the purpose to give substantial discretion to those charged with enforcing and adjudicating alleged violations, in which case the provisions serve that purpose very well.

Stephen P. Garvey, A. Robert Noll Professor of Law

These proposed procedures improve the existing ones in crucial ways. Thank you for doing this important work.

I have a few suggestions:

• The procedures for interim restrictive orders differ from the procedures for emergency suspensions. Yet some interim restrictive orders could be very restrictive, even amounting to an effective suspension. I would recommend extending to coercive interim measures the enhanced procedures that are provided for emergency suspensions.
• Elements of due process include: 1) notice, 2) an opportunity to be heard, and 3) reasoned decision by an impartial party. The proposed procedures provide for a written explanation, which is salutary, but no notice and no opportunity to be heard (before the measure is imposed). I believe notice and an opportunity to be heard should be provided, if at all practicable given the urgency. As for decision by an impartial party, that is not provided for interim restrictive orders, even on appeal, and arguably is not provided by the three-person appellate panel for emergency suspensions, which is made up of administrators. Appeal to an independent body, such as the UHRP, would be preferable.
• For both interim measures and emergency suspensions, I recommend a clearer statement that the purpose of summary action is solely to protect the safety of self and others, or to preserve university property or operations, while the issue is adjudicated on the merits. Punishment is not the purpose of interim measures or suspensions. The proposal does say that emergency suspension should be used only when less restrictive measures are insufficient to “protect” the complainant or the university community, but the term “protect” is unspecified. 

Thank you once more for your work. These changes will improve this crucial process, with or without my recommendations.

Nelson Tebbe

Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law

I thank the committee for their work revising the Student Code, and I am broadly supportive of the proposed revisions. 

While the proposed changes to the emergency suspension policy do increase clarity about when they can be used, add automatic reviews, and clarify the review procedure, I think they could be tuned a bit more. In particular, I remain concerned that emergency suspensions for non-violent conduct are not more constrained by the procedures. 

The proposed language would enable emergency suspensions when "there exists reasonable basis for ongoing concern over possible impact on or disruption to university operations, including teaching and learning ." There is a lot of interpretation here about "reasonable," "ongoing," "possible," "impact," and "disruption." I think the goal is to have a mechanism to prevent a student who is engaging in repeated, perhaps escalating, conduct that significantly disrupts university functions, such as classroom teaching. As written, it is not clear that this could not be applied to a student who had only violated a time, place, or manner restriction at a protest -- a case where I see no reason for any emergency action and the normal adjudication process can proceed. 

I recommend the committee reconsider the language here. Looking at the ideas developed by the Expressive Activities Committee, quoted below, might be helpful: 
"We recommend that temporary suspension should be used only in two circumstances where the normal deliberative disciplinary processes are inadequate:

(1) When a university member's conduct poses an imminent risk of violence, physical harm, 

substantial property damage, or individualized harassment or intimidation. 

(2) When a university member is engaged in a course of conduct that is significantly disruptive to other Cornellians’ participation in campus life or to essential university operations. For example, if a student repeatedly enters a library and blows an airhorn several days in a row, the threat of continued disruption to other students' ability to study and learn may justify a temporary suspension."

Please make stronger penalties and procedures for academic hazing, including verbal or passive-aggressive abuse from advisors and professors, as well as peer abuse during seminars (feedback delivered in derogatory, inappropriate, bad-faith manner or otherwise academic bullying), verbal abuse and academic bullying from professors (for example, professor resentful towards student for absenteeism, instead of addressing it with them or adjusting the grade accordingly, the professor lashes out at them during their presentation with disproportionate criticism and harsh degrading manner). Please also make broad campus awareness-raising on these matters and that it will not be tolerated, and raise awareness about the according punishments and access to remedy.

Typo "fariness" should be "fairness"

If I recall correctly, marijuana/cannabis is legal for both medicinal and recreational use for individuals over the age of 21 in the state of New York. Since Cornell does not stand on federally owned land, the standard for marijuana/cannabis use should follow the standard set by the state of New York, rather than federal decisions.

Even if we follow the stricter bar set by federal decisions, I believe the FDA has approved some marijuana- and cannabis- related drugs for prescription use and this use may be affected by the new provisions. Please see the following link: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12270

More reasonably, marijuana/cannabis should be treated the same as other drugs in subsection G. Additionally, subsection G.2 is vague as to the fact that prescription medication is part of the exception.

All of the proposed changes are in a very positive direction. The main thing I think needs to be very clear in the case of temporary suspension:

It cannot be used for punishment for alleged past behavior (because the past behavior has not bee adjudicated). It must be used only for prevention of future harm. That means a single disruptive event, even if there's actually strong evidence that the student is responsible for a conduct violation, should not in and of itself be treated as proof of future danger. Someone could act up once and then not again. 

Many students have expressed concern that interim suspensions have been used disproportionately, particularly in the context of protest activity framed as a threat to campus safety and order. The proposed revisions in Section VIII (e.g., limiting emergency suspensions to "extraordinary circumstances", reevaluation of suspensions at the beginning of each academic semester, and a three-person appeal review panel) are positive improvements that should help improve fairness.

However, the use of emergency suspensions is still determined largely by the subjective decision-making of the Director, with the factors outlined in Section VIII.C.1 leaving room for broad interpretation and the potential influence of bias. While acknowledging that every situation is different and requires some level of discretion and the ability to enact protective measures quickly, the Procedures should clarify as much as possible the objective thresholds justifying suspensions to prevent their disproportionate use. 

For example, "extraordinary circumstances" should be clarified to mean credible evidence of imminent and continuing physical violence, significant property damage, or substantial disruption to University operations that cannot be mitigated by partial restrictions. Specific evidence demonstrating a continuing risk, rather than a single incident of non-violent misconduct, should be required. The Issuing Official's written determination detailing the basis for the suspension should specify why less restrictive measures were deemed insufficient. Further, use of the emergency suspensions should prompt an expedited review timeline so that protracted interim measures do not become the de facto punishment for an unadjudicated complaint.

Why did the committee feel adding this language was necessary in a state where cannabis use is legal? Is this part of the deal with Trump?

The new definition of bribery is overbroad and should be limited to an official  decision or action.  

revisions are clear